Annoying Lie #2: It Wasn't Necessary to Use the Atomic Bomb on Japan, and the U.S. Knew It

(Hat-Tip Goes to Spoons and Austin Bay)

A recent article by Richard B. Frank, a World War II historian in The Weekly Standard refutes the simplistic claims that the US bombed Japan while knowing that Japan was already planning peace. The truth is far more complex, according to Mr. Frank:

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.

Also, Mr. Frank makes note that the proposal of a US invasion of Japan was not an action that was gauranteed to even be done. In fact, he argues that Truman had to choose between extending the war indefinitely if an invasion didn't take place, invading Japan and suffering horrific losses that may have caused a serious morale problem in war-weary America, and the choice he made, to use the Atomic Bomb on Japan in the hopes of never needing to invade Japan and still delivering damage to the country in which the Japanese could realize that perhaps unconditional surrender would be preferable to fighting a war with a power with such a devastating weapon.

This issue is perhaps very personal for me, due to the fact that I may very well would not have been born if such an action had not occurred. My grandfather had actually been drafted to the military late in the war, first as a cook for a POW camp for captured Nazi soldiers, then he was sent to fight in the proposed invasion of Japan. Even if we did not invade Japan and not use the Atomic Bomb, he, as well as many soldiers may very well have died fighting the Japanese who still did not see the situation as hopeless as it is not remembered to be. This does not mean I don't have sympathy for those who have suffered from Atomic Bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but that doesn't mean that I should condemn my country for being warlike in a time of war. Unfortunately, too many academics and ill-informed individuals have taken the other side of this argument.

I highly recommend people read this article. It has extremely good arguments that may very well help you in the next argument with bleeding-heart hand-wringers who blindly accept the flawed lie that the US simply nuked Japan just for the hell of it. Also, it has some great info for the World War II history buff.